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Abstract
We develop a theoretical model in which an industry and NGO play salience
games—they act strategically to influence public attention to social impacts in the
sector. Salience stimulates extra donations for the NGO, and thus firms have incen-
tives to hide the damage they do in order to avoid public attention. We show that when
public attention is scarce, a greater campaign orientation induces industry to invest
in greater obfuscation, starving the NGO of funds. The NGO in turn strategically bi-
ases its mission away from campaigns—and in favor of sector-wide versus firm-specific
campaigns—but not by as much as a welfare-motivated planner would want. When
public attention is avoided by a mixture of substantive and symbolic action, we show
that a greater weight on the former induces the NGO to become more campaign-
oriented, with social damage lower. Highly competitive industries have greater incen-
tives to commit to substantive actions.
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1 Introduction
Firms and industries vary not just in the flow of environmental (or social) damages they pro-
duce, but also in the propensity for these negative impacts to catch the public eye (Hoffman
and Ocasio, 2001). Polluters have obvious reasons for preferring that their impacts avoid
public attention (become “salient”).1 Green activists have other incentives. They recognize
that they get more donations when damage is in the public eye—donations that can then
be used to deliver a more potent campaign against the industry and/or to increase spend-
ing on other unrelated activities. This makes management of salience a key battleground
between polluters and the green NGOs with which they interact, something both sides seek
strategically to influence. It is the implications of such “salience games” that we explore.
Our starting point is the recognition that public attention is a scarce resource, and that
“[w]henever the amount of information produced exceeds the amount of attention available
to consume it, a competition for attention is born” (Thorngate et al., 2011, p. 17). Davenport
and Beck (2001, p. 8) assert that managing scarce attention is the central task of modern
business: “If you want to be successful in the current economy, you’ve got to be good at
getting attention.” Or—if you are causing damage, as are the firms in our model—good at
avoiding attention.
Researchers in several disciplines have sought to understand the process through which
particular social issues enter public consciousness. Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) start their
classic sociological treatment with the following questions,
Why does the plight of the indigenous people of South America receive less public
attention than the plight of laboratory rats used in scientific research? Why do
toxic chemical wastes flowing into landfills receive more public discussion than the
dangerous chemicals present in America’s workplaces? The extent of the harm
in these cases cannot, in itself, explain these differences, and it is not enough
to say that some of these situations become problems because they are more
“important”. All of these problems are important—or at least capable of being
seen as such. (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988, p. 54)
They go on to make a compelling case that the focus of community attention at any
given time is not exogenously given, but rather endogenous and manipulable.
1The concept of salience is an important one in a number of fields. In psychology salience refers to
any aspect of a stimulus that, for whatever reason, stands out from the rest. In neuroscience, salience is
“a state or quality by which something stands out relative to its neighbors” (Wikipedia entry for Salience
(neuroscience), accessed December 2016). This notion of conspicuousness relative to others will recur in the
model here. Salience has been introduced in economics, though applied quite differently, by Chetty et al.
(2009). In their model consumers under react to a sales tax that is not factored into the ticket price—they
fail to “notice” it.
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We develop a model in which public attention is limited and can only attend to a small
number of issues at once. Plausibly, we assume that the probability the damage done by
a given firm catches the public eye depends on the quantity and visibility of that damage,
both of which the firm can manipulate. But this likelihood is not determined in a vacuum.
Rather, the behaviors of one firm vie for attention with the behaviors of others, and with
a diverse set of unrelated but attention-worthy topics (e.g., excessive immigration, prison
reform, the state of the national finances).
Regardless of how the behavior of a firm comes to public attention, by rendering a
particular issue or practice salient it will typically cause attention to fall not just on the
particular firm but the industry/practice in general. As a senior Amoco executive quoted in
Hoffman (2001, p. 189) put it, “[w]e are an oil company, and we have to live with the sins
of our brothers. We all get painted with the same brush.”2
It is straightforward to think of cases in which the polluting behavior of firms catches the
public eye. For example, the headline in The Daily Mail newspaper on 15 April 2016 was
“China’s Zhongting River Turns Red Due to Illegal Waste,” and tells how the local residents
were alerted to the illegal discharge practices of iron processors by the change in color of
the river water. Because it is impossible for downstream residents to assess which upstream
firms were responsible for the contamination, it is natural that the entire upstream industry
became salient after the incident. However, an entire industry can become salient even when
an event can be traced back to a specific firm. For example, in 2013 a train hauling oil
derailed in the small Quebec town of Lac-Me´gantic, causing widespread damage and killing
47. It became the 2013 Canadian Press News Story of the Year. Before the derailing most
Canadians were unaware of the fact that crude oil was transported by train, let alone of
the detailed issues around wagon design, routing and scheduling practices that subsequently
became subjects of popular discussion. As such it was an event that launched public debates
about the environmental and safety implications of the continent’s boom in oil-by-rail. “It
caused everyone living in a small Canadian city, or town that had freight rumbling through
it, to stop and ponder” (The Toronto Star, 25 December 2013).3 4
2In this spirit there is a well-established theoretical and empirical literature on collective reputation as
“the influence of stakeholder activism has made industry-level reputation management more important than
ever” (Winn et al., 2008, p. 35).
3For modeling purposes we treat the negative externality as a flow—and for that reason use the terms
behavior and impact interchangeably—but this last example highlights that single events (such as accidents)
can play an important role in attracting “the focus of public attention” (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001, p. 414).
At the cost of complexity, the model we present could be adapted to allow for stochasticity, though the
insights would be undisturbed.
4While our focus is environmental, the logic could be applied to a wider set of social impacts. A non-
environmental example relates to the coming to awareness of unfair labor practices in the tea sector. In
a 2014 report by The Guardian newspaper—Assam’s Modern Slaves: The Real Price of a Cup of Tetleys
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There are diverse reasons why an industry might want to avoid public scrutiny over
social impacts, and these have been investigated in various strands of literature (e.g., Fried-
man, 1999; Baron, 2001; Lyon and Maxwell, 2008). Our objective is to better understand
the strategic interaction between activists and industries in a setting where we explicitly
recognize that public attention is scarce. In our model it is because the vitality of the
NGO—supported by the funds that it is able to garner—increases with public awareness of
the issue in question, making it a more formidable opponent. In the words of Stroup and
Meiners (2000, p. 18): “A crisis captures the public eye. Activist organizations benefit from
a crisis. . . It keeps them funded.”
The model will embody a variety of simplifications and assumptions—and our main
results are likely robust to varying many of the particularities of the model—however at the
core are the following elements.
(1) Industry: Each firm in an industry chooses independently how much environmen-
tal damage to impose, and how much effort to devote to reducing the visibility of that
damage—the likelihood that it gets noticed. We use the terminology “cloaking” for the
latter. Reducing damage and/or visibility is costly. For clarity of exposition we will go some
way with a simplified version of the model in which the damage level is fixed, to concentrate
on the “information management” dimension of the game, but section 3 relaxes this assump-
tion. Importantly, this is not a disclosure game in the spirit of Milgrom (1981) because firms
do not choose whether to disclose a particular piece of information; instead, they choose a
cloaking strategy that influences the probability they will become salient.
(2) Limited public attention and salience: The probability that the damage done
by a particular firm catches the public eye depends on the quantity and visibility of that
damage compared to competing demands for public attention. There are various ways in
which this could be modeled. Bordalo et al. (2013) propose a general “salience function.”
We adopt the more tractable “attention contest function” approach, similar to Haan and
Moraga-Gonza´lez (2011), in which each firm’s behavior constitutes a “bid” for attention in
Tea—a journalist exposed the very low wages paid to pickers of Tetleys tea (at 94 rupees per day barely half
the minimum wage in that jurisdiction). It led to public outrage and spawned articles by Time Magazine,
CNN about the sector in general (for example two subsequent BBC reports were entitled Top Tea Brands
Exposed, and The Bitter Story Behind the UK’s National Drink and each listed in their opening paragraph
several of the big brands). Indeed, it almost immediately became clear that Tetley was no different from
others: “tea pickers’ wages in Assam are set not by any individual company but by an industry-wide wage
settlement . . . [t]herefore, such wages apply equally to all tea plantation companies in Assam, which have
been supplying and continue to supply many of the world’s tea brands” (Bouckley, 2014). After concerns
about child labor are identified in the supply chain of Ferrero, the account immediately makes clear that
the impact is sector-wide; indeed, the article goes on to refer to Hershey, Mars and Nestle by name and to
observe that “[c]ocoa is generally produced by farmers living in extreme poverty, and child labor is common
on the majority of cocoa farms” (Sequeira, 2016).
4
a contest for public attention.5 If any one firm in the industry catches the public eye, then
we say that the performance of the industry is salient.
(3) NGO and salience as a “cash cow”: An NGO receives donations and uses them
to extract “clean-up” from the industry but also to engage in other projects. Critically,
income to the NGO is assumed higher when the issue/industry is salient. While we suggest
plausible micro-foundations that could be used to underpin such a relationship, the analysis
remains reduced form in this regard. Abstracting from detailed assumptions about donor
behavior and consumer rationality sharpens our focus on the game between industry and
NGO.6 The NGO is defined by a mission statement that commits it to how it will split its
income between various activities.
Our set-up allows us to think in a more nuanced way about the incentives facing firms
and NGOs. The collective character of industry salience—that if the practices of one firm
engaged in a particular activity make the front page then the whole sector finds itself in the
public gaze—creates a particular pattern of incentives within an industry. This can affect
both the level of environmental damage and the intensity of effort with which damage is
cloaked.
Of course, just as industry has incentives to manage salience, so too the NGO will want
to engage in what might be called “issue maintenance”—influencing the likelihood that the
public becomes aware of the social impacts of the sector. There are a variety of ways in
which the NGO might seek to do this directly; it might, for example, pay for television
advertising or hand out pamphlets to raise awareness of social impacts directly. These
have been modeled elsewhere, and we abstract from them here (Abito et al., 2016). The two
mechanisms that will feature in the current model are more structural in character, and relate
to NGO design—what “sort” of NGO would be expected to flourish in this environment?
These mechanisms are: (a) the NGO may commit to (or develop a reputation for) a strategy
that involves not targeting a campaign too narrowly on the particular firm whose activities
triggered industry salience, and/or (b) the NGO may adopt a mission that commits it to
channel a higher-than-otherwise fraction of its income to projects other than campaigning
against the salient industry.7 Each of these weakens the industry-level and intra-industry
5As noted, public attention does not always focus on the issue of greatest social import. There is a
non-deterministic dimension to these things that we capture by way of the contest success function. The
public may become fixated on celebrity behavior commentary, the “tweets” of politicians etc.; it is beyond
the scope of this paper to provide an explicit rational actor model of public attention. Cloaking behavior
can reduce the likelihood that a firm’s damages catch the public eye, which seems eminently realistic.
6NGOs and charities are well aware that having “their” issue salient is a key driver of donations. To take
a dramatic non-industry example, consider the following headline: “Aid Groups See Dramatic Increase in
Donations after Death of Syrian Toddler” (Los Angeles Times, 3 September 2015).
7Traditional folk wisdom is that an NGO will always target a particular firm, especially if it is trying to
mobilize a consumer boycott. It is clearly much easier to induce a consumer to abstain from the purchase
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incentives to invest in collective-salience avoidance. We explore these and other possibilities
below.
2 Model
2.1 Firms
There is a single industry made up of n symmetric firms. The activity of each firm generates
net income r (revenues net of production costs) and creates environmental damage d. For
ease of presentation we will talk about environmental damage or pollution, but it should be
apparent that d can be interpreted more widely. The damage done by each firm is known by
an NGO (and by industry members), but may or may not be noted by “the public,” which
is limited in its attention.
One way in which a firm might try to avoid public attention is by reducing the damage
it does ex ante (i.e., abatement). Initially we will ignore this option, fixing d in this section
in order to focus on other cloaking actions. Later, in section 3, we show that endogenizing
d, while complicating the analysis, does not disturb the central results.
The visibility of damage may vary between firms in a way that a firm can influence. A
firm chooses an amount of effort h to hide its damage from public visibility. The larger an
h a firm chooses, the less visible is its damage, and we will sometimes refer to it as cloaking
effort.8 This formulation implies that there is no social benefit to such effort—it simply
makes it less likely that the public will “notice” the damage being done.9 The choice of h
can be thought of as embedded in a choice of technology, with technology broadly construed
to include processes and practices. For example, firms may engage in “greenwashing” to
make themselves appear environmentally responsible—see Lyon and Montgomery (2015) for
a review. A firm’s cloaking effort may also be more technical in nature and relate to the
“inspectability” of its facilities (Heyes, 2000), or the precision of its disclosure documents
(Sinclair-Desgagne´ and Gozlan, 2003).
of a particular brand of coffee, gasoline or sports apparel than from the product in general. Despite this we
frequently observe campaigns launched against sectors or activities more widely—the nuclear power sector,
the tea industry, the activity of oil-by rail, etc.—consistent with the model here.
8Although our modeling approach is different, and we focus on a metric of social performance, our notion
of cloaking is similar to shrouding of product attributes in Gabaix and Laibson (2006).
9That reducing d might also be a way to reduce probability of salience—and that such reductions imply
additional benefits external to the firm—complicates the welfare analysis when we get to it later. The fixed
d variant that we develop in this section allows for cleaner elucidation of our main insights.
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2.2 Salience
Central to our model is the concept of salience: public attention is limited. For simplicity,
suppose that in any period the public can only be attentive to a single topic, and this topic
is said to be the salient one (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). This could reflect constraints for
the media—there can only be one lead story on the television news or on the front page—
which necessitates the selection of stories by editors. Or it could represent something more
primitive about the process whereby public gaze is drawn to one of a set of issues.
Let there be n + 1 topics—the environmental damage being done by firm 1, the envi-
ronmental damage being done by firm 2, etc., and some unrelated “outside” topic. In a
fuller model one could envisage having more than one industry, each with multiple firms.
The degree to which this outside event draws attention away from the industry will give a
measure of how challenging is the public relations context. A more visible outside option
will make it, other things equal, easier for firms in the industry to avoid the public eye.
Assumption 1 (Catching the Public Eye). The activities of firm i catch the public eye
with probability p(hi, h−i) where h−i =
∑
j 6=i hj, p1(hi, ·) < 0, p11(hi, ·) > 0, p2(·, h−i) > 0,
p22(·, h−i) > 0, and p12(h, (n− 1)h) ≥ 0.
In other words, the likelihood that a particular firm catches the public eye depends
not only on its visibility, but also on the visibility of others. Following Haan and Moraga-
Gonza´lez (2011), salience then takes the form of a contest where each firm “bids” for attention
(albeit this is a contest that the firm is trying to lose).10
The probability that firm i’s environmental conduct becomes salient is decreasing in its
cloaking effort (although there are diminishing marginal returns to such effort) and increasing
in the effort that other firms put into their own cloaking. These are fairly natural assumptions
and reflect the ideas that there is scarcity of public attention and that firms can influence
the likelihood that their actions catch the public eye. This is motivated by our discussion
of salience up to this point as stemming from both a scarcity of public attention and the
behavior of firms. The last condition in assumption 1 says that, when all firms engage in the
same amount of effort, the marginal return of putting more effort into obfuscation, from the
point of view of a particular firm, is decreasing in the collective effort levels of others. This
is motivated by the idea that salience is relative—if the average level of cloaking effort by
10One might question whether it is realistic that salience can be influenced by firms’ actions at all, since
in practice there are so many alternative options to catch public attention. However, there is a large
management literature showing that firms devote substantial attention to diverting public attention from
their less savory activities (Oliver, 1991), something they would not bother to do if they felt their actions
had no impact. For example, they may engage in “symbolic management” by issuing public statements that
are not related to their actual behavior (Westpahl and Zajac, 1998), or they may greenwash by selectively
disclosing positive information while withholding negative information (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011).
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firms increases, this will never make it easier for a particular firm to avoid public scrutiny
by investing in cloaking of their own. These are common features of typical multi-player
contest success functions (including, for example, the Tullock-Buchanan contest function
used in Haan and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2011)).
The outside option also represents a “bid” for attention and leaves open the possibility
that no firm in the industry that we model will catch the public eye.11 This is realistic.
Because we assume that at most one firm can catch the public eye, the probability that
some firm in our industry does so is
∑n
j=1 p(hj, h−j) < 1. To embed in the model the notion
of salience as a collective or industry-level phenomenon, if any firm i in the industry catches
the public eye then we say that the industry is salient. In other words, if the behavior of
any one firm catches the public eye, that behavior becomes salient for the whole industry.
This conforms with various examples that we presented earlier and allows us to explore
important intra-industry incentives. Of course, in practice the spillover of public focus from
one firm to another might be less than complete—so that one firm catching the public eye
would not necessarily or fully draw attention to the same behavior engaged in by other firms
in the same sector—but the notion that salience of an industry emerges endogenously from
the behavior of constituent firms is consistent with existing research but has been ignored
altogether in existing formal models (e.g., Baron, 2001, 2016).12
2.3 The NGO
There is a single NGO that is concerned with environmental improvement. It can pursue
its objective in two ways. Since d is assumed fixed in this section, the NGO cannot (for the
moment) directly influence the amount of damage created by the industry. It can, however,
put pressure on firms to clean-up and mitigate the damage done. That is, while the NGO
cannot influence firms to abate ex ante, it can still reduce environmental damage ex post
by pressuring firms to mitigate some of the environmental damage done in their operations.
The process by which this happens is black-boxed here but this is a common formulation
(Baron, 2009, 2011) in stylized NGO/firm conflict settings. More concretely the NGO can
launch a campaign. If an NGO spends x on a campaign against a firm then it can “force”
that firm to clean-up an amount of damage αx, where α is a parameter that indexes the
11There can be many outside options competing for attention; we treat the outside option as non-strategic.
12Technically speaking, the assumption that the entire industry becomes salient is not essential to the
model. All that is needed is that the resources available to the NGO are greater if any one firm in the
industry catches the public eye. Once that occurs, the NGO’s preference for a campaign that is broad in
scope (which we demonstrate below in Proposition 5) ensures that any one firm catching the public eye
would impact prospects for all firms in the industry.
As will be seen shortly, it would not be difficult to generalize salience to incomplete spillover in public
attention. We focus on the simpler case described.
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campaigning effectiveness of the NGO. An NGO with a higher α is a more effective opponent
and is able to force more cleanup-per-dollar (a similar reduced form approach to campaigns
is taken by, for example, Baron (2009)).
A good example of clean-up operations comes from oil spills such as those of the Exxon
Valdez or the Deepwater Horizon. These are ex post actions that attempt to partially
compensate for the damages already done. (In section 3 we extend our analysis to include
the possibility of abatement, i.e., ex ante actions that reduce the amount of damage that a
firm will ultimately create. In the case of the Exxon Valdez, for example, this might have
involved constructing the ship with greater structural integrity.)
In addition to campaigning against one or more firms in this industry, the NGO can also
direct effort towards non-campaign activities that we will formalize as a single “backstop”
project. This is realistic—many of the bigger activist groups not only run campaigns against
polluters but also operate large-scale conservation projects. The WWF-International website
details their campaigning against various lines of business, but also the work done in fourteen
of their largest conservation areas. For example, the six million square-kilometer Coral
Triangle provides a “global center of marine biodiversity” in the seas between the Philippines,
Papua New Guinea and Malaysia (see Figure 1). As well as matching reality, analytically
the backstop project has the effect of ensuring that in its decision making the NGO has a
strictly positive opportunity cost of funds devoted to this campaign. This is realistic and
sensible.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
If industry does x units of clean-up, this reduces the amount of damage done by the
industry and the NGO gets payoff b(x), where ∂b(x)/∂x > 0 and ∂2b(x)/∂x2 < 0. If instead
the NGO devotes x units of resource to the backstop, this produces payoff φb(x), where
φ > 0. For a given budget the NGO’s objective is the sum of these payoffs (Baron, 2009).
The NGO requires money in order to campaign and/or to contribute to the backstop
project. Support for it is stimulated when the industry is salient.
Assumption 2 (Salience boosts NGO income). NGO income is m if the industry is salient,
and m < m otherwise. We define me = m−m as the boost in NGO income associated with
salience.
There are several ways in which a sub-model could be appended to motivate this as-
sumption. For example, there could exist some “latent” or “unaware” donors who donate
if and only if the issue/industry in question comes to their attention (is salient), similar to
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donors in Aldashev and Verdier (2010).13 It is the income boost associated with salience
that provides the incentive for firms in the industry to worry about salience, and for the
NGO to want to “issue manage.”
To define itself, the NGO chooses a mission statement—the statement of what it does—
and a targeting strategy.
Assumption 3 (NGO Design). The NGO (a) adopts a mission statement that specifies the
fraction γ of funds to be devoted to campaigns, with the remainder (1− γ) being directed to
the backstop project; (b) decides whether it will target campaigns at the industry as a whole
(broad campaign) or at the firm which caught the public eye and triggered salience (narrow
campaign).
Ex ante there is uncertainty over the funds the NGO will obtain and this will depend
upon the subsequent choices of firms and the outcome of the probabilistic salience process.
We treat the choice of mission statement and campaign type as institutional design choices.
Heyes and Martin (2015) provide a formal model of NGO mission-statement competition
in a multiple NGO setting. Alternatively, we can think of the analysis as addressing the
question: What sort of NGO will prosper in these circumstances? The design choices of the
NGO set the activist backdrop against which firms in the industry then make choices.
Note that for analytic convenience we abstract from the possibility that the NGO’s choice
of γ might directly influence donations. The model can be extended to allow for that—at the
expense of additional notation and margins to consider—but nothing fundamental changes
in terms of results. We have deliberately simplified donor behavior as it is not the focus here.
For the qualitative insights of the analysis to hold all that the model needs is that salience
boosts NGO income (assumption 2).
The mission commits the NGO to how it will divide funds between the campaign against
this industry and the backstop project. Of course we do not propose that an actual NGO
writes such a split so starkly into the contract it implicitly has with members and other
supporters. However, the big environmental groups are quite stable in the ways in which they
disburse funds through time among broad spending categories.14 The NGO also commits to
13For instance, it is widely observed that charitable donations increase in the wake of a natural disaster,
and that these donations are often quite out of proportion to need but rather to how the disaster is reported
(Evangelidis and van den Bergh, 2013). This is similar to the “identifiable victim effect,” where donors will
donate more to help identifiable victims, such as those seen in pictures, rather than (an equal number of)
statistical victims (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997).
Salience is an inherently behavioral concept and as such we do not wish to go too far down the road of
developing a model with rational, forward-looking Bayesian donors. Any model that implies a higher income
to the NGO in the event of industry salience will suffice.
14As shown in Lyon (2010), the major environmental groups tend to fall into two camps, either confronta-
tional groups such as Greenpeace that devote a large share of their resources to anti-corporate campaigns,
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a campaign strategy. We consider the two extreme types of targeting, one in which the NGO
campaigns against the whole sector equally, dividing its resources for campaigning across all
firms, and another in which it campaigns only against the firm whose catching of the public
eye triggered salience. Commitment is most likely established by reputation in a repeated
version of the model—is this an NGO which makes a habit of going after particular firms, or
after broader issues? We establish later that the NGO will always prefer the latter, so the
core of our analysis embeds that choice.
2.4 Timing
The timing of the game is straightforward.
1. (NGO) The NGO commits to a mission γ and targeting strategy (narrow or broad).
2. (Firms) Firms independently choose their cloaking efforts h.
3. (Nature) Salience or non-salience of the industry is realized (this is stochastic, in line
with the expression in assumption 1).
4. The NGO’s income is realized (higher if salience is realized in stage 3) and it follows
the allocation rule that it chose in stage 1.
This timing is summarized in figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Before solving the game, it is worthwhile to discuss the timing. Design of the mission
statement in the first stage follows Heyes and Martin (2015): the NGO commits to how it
will allocate income between activities ex ante.15 The design of the NGO signals to firms
what sort of opponent it will be and influences the choices of firms, in particular how much
effort they devote to reducing visibility for fear of facing a costly campaign. Firms can then
use this information in stage 2 when they decide how much effort to exert to cloak their
environmental damage. Stage 3 is where the main novelty of the model resides—the NGO
or collaborative groups such as Environmental Defense Fund that devote the bulk of their resources to other
activities.
15Credibility is important here as ex post the NGO will always wish to choose γ to equalize marginal
benefit across issues. There are several reasons to think that the mission set ex ante is credible. Beyond
reputational reasons, the choice of mission could also entail some sunk cost if γ is seen as a technology for
using funds (e.g., by purchasing the Rainbow Warrior, Greenpeace commits to a marine campaign of some
intensity). It is standard in the literature to assume that the NGO can credibly commit to its campaign
(Baron and Diermeier, 2007).
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has greater income when the industry with which it is matched becomes salient, and this
depends in part on the resources firms employ to remain out of the public eye. Finally, since
the NGO can successfully commit to its mission, the NGO mechanically enacts its mission
ex post in stage 4 and payoffs are realized.
2.5 Solving the Model
We solve backwards and restrict attention to symmetric, sub-game perfect Nash equilibria.
Proofs are in the Appendix.
2.5.1 NGO funds and campaign (stages 3 and 4)
By definition, for any given level of funds m that the NGO has available, it spends an amount
γm on a campaign against the targeted firm or firms in the industry, forcing cleanup αγm.
Remaining funds (1 − γ)m are spent on the backstop project. The improvement to the
environment, and thus the payoff to the NGO, is
B(γ,m) ≡ b(αγm) + φb((1− γ)m).
If the industry becomes salient, the NGO attracts a higher level of funds m, otherwise the
lower level m. The NGO benefits from industry salience.
For the purpose of benchmarking, define γˆ to be the mission statement the NGO would
choose if it were unable to influence salience. In this case it would choose a mission to
maximize overall benefits by balancing the marginal benefit of funds allocated to campaigning
with the marginal benefit of funds allocated to the backstop issue. Thus, γˆ satisfies
B1(γˆ,m) = αb
′(αγˆm)m− φb′((1− γˆ)m)m = 0
or
b′(αγˆm)
b′((1− γˆ)m) =
φ
α
. (1)
In order to simplify the benchmark and ensure that the NGO’s choice of mission is time-
consistent, assume that b′ is multiplicative in the sense that b′(αx) = b′(α)b′(x) (e.g., b(x) =
log(x) has this property). This ensures that the NGO’s optimal mission in the absence of
endogenous salience, γˆ, is not a function of the level of resources, m, that it has available.
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2.5.2 Firm choices (stage 2)
Firms anticipate how the NGO will behave contingent on the income that it has (and hence
the salience of outcomes). If the NGO campaign targets equally all firms in the industry
(which we show below is optimal), dividing the resources for its campaign across all n firm,
then the expected payoff for a firm i is
Epi(hi, h−i) = r − 1
n
n∑
j=1
p(hj, h−j)αγme − αγm
n
− hi.
This makes clear that strategic interdependence between firms here comes through the shared
nature of the salience outcome. If any one firm catches the public eye, the whole industry is
rendered salient and finds itself confronted by a better-funded NGO that launches a campaign
against all firms in the industry.
Firm i chooses hi to maximize its own expected profits. An interior solution h
∗
i is then
implicitly defined by the associated first-order condition[
−p1(h∗i , h−i)−
∑
k 6=i
p2(hk, h
∗
i + h−k−i)
]
αγme
n
= 1.
By reducing the visibility of its damage, a firm can reduce the expected funds available to the
NGO, conditional on the actions of other firms, and hence the expected cost of a campaign.
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, h∗,
[−p1 (h∗, (n− 1)h∗)− (n− 1)p2 (h∗, (n− 1)h∗)] αγme
n
= 1. (2)
The equilibrium h∗ can be seen as the industry’s collective action to influence salience. When
all firms operate in a “reputation commons”—i.e., exist in a setting where all members of
the industry are “tarred with the same brush”—there are incentives to engage in collective
management of salience (Winn et al., 2008).
Taking the total derivative of (2) leads directly to the following.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium effort by firms to cloak environmental damage is (a) increasing
in the fraction of funds an NGO commits to campaign and (b) increasing in the effectiveness
of the NGO. That is, ∂h∗/∂γ > 0 and ∂h∗/∂α > 0.
If an NGO commits to directing a greater portion of income to campaigns, and/or is
more effective per unit of campaign funds, then firms spend more on trying to avoid industry
salience. This alerts us to a strategic consideration that the NGO will want to account for in
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designing itself: a greater campaign orientation will encourage greater cloaking effort from
the industry.
Industry structure naturally affects the severity of free-riding within the industry and so
collective incentives. As each of the n firms in the industry are by assumption the same size,
increasing the number of firms reduces concentration in the industry. Totally differentiating
(2) leads to the following.
Proposition 2. As the number of firms in the industry increases (concentration decreases)
each firm exerts less cloaking effort (i.e., dh∗/dn < 0), and the probability of industry salience
increases.
There is a collective action problem associated with managing the visibility of the indus-
try. In less concentrated industries each firm is less careful about cloaking its environmental
damage—put another way, as concentration falls the willingness of any individual firm to
invest in collective reputation is diminished.16
An interesting implication of the above results is the following;
Corollary 1. Equilibrium profit of a representative firm may be increasing or decreasing in
γ. For a sufficiently unconcentrated industry, the equilibrium profit of a representative firm
will be increasing in γ
This may seem counterintuitive, since firms naturally prefer not to have to face cam-
paigns from NGOs. However, we cannot rule out that a typical firm may be better off when
facing an NGO committed to devoting a larger share of incremental donations to campaign-
ing, since when faced by such an NGO all firms in the sector are induced to take greater
care to reduce the visibility of their behaviors. The intensification of campaigning helps to
reduce the problem of free-riding between firms. This free-riding problem becomes more
pronounced in less concentrated settings, so for a large enough n the profits of an individual
firm unambiguously increase with the NGO’s campaign orientation.
2.5.3 NGO mission design (stage 1)
Given the ways that firms behave (characterized above) the expected payoff for the NGO is
EB(γ,m) = np(h∗, (n− 1)h∗)B(γ,m) + (1− np(h∗, (n− 1)h∗))B(γ,m).
The NGO chooses γ—designs its mission—to maximize its expected payoff. If salience
were uninfluenced by the actions of the NGO or the firms, and the NGO’s budget were simply
16Of course, as the number of firms in the industry rises total damage increases, which will also increase
the probability of industry salience. This effect is in addition to the effect identified in Proposition 2.
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a randomization between m and m, with the probability of m given by some exogenous p,
then an interior solution to the NGO’s mission design problem would be γˆ. We will refer to
the mission chosen in this fashion as reflecting the impact effect of the NGO’s design choice.
When salience is determined endogenously, however, the NGO knows that how it designs
itself will influence the level of funds it has available both for campaigns and for its other
activities. Thus, we can define the “salience effect” S(γ,m,m) as the marginal effect of a
change in the NGO’s mission on its expected payoffs, written as
S(γ,m,m) ≡ ndp(h
∗, (n− 1)h∗)
dh
∂h∗(γ)
∂γ
[B(γ,m)−B(γ,m)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Salience
effect
, (3)
where dp/dh ≡ p1 + (n− 1)p2.
With salience endogenous, an interior solution to the NGO’s problem is at γ∗ defined by
∂EB(γ∗,m)
∂γ
= E
∂B(γ∗,m)
∂γ
+ S(γ∗,m,m) = 0. (4)
Recall that, from (2), dp/dh < 0 and Proposition 1 showed that ∂h∗/∂γ > 0. It is easy to see
that B(γ,m) > B(γ,m), so that S(γ,m,m) < 0. Thus, with endogenous salience the NGO
does not simply choose γ to equalize expected marginal benefit across its policy domains
(impact effect). Instead, the NGO takes account of how that choice influences expected
funds (salience effect).
Since E∂2B(γ,m)/∂γ2 < 0, (4) implies the following.
Proposition 3 (Salience influences NGO mission design). The NGO devotes a smaller
fraction of funds to the campaign than would equalize expected marginal impact between
campaign and backstop activity; that is, γ∗ < γˆ.
In effect, the NGO designs itself so as to soften the penalty faced by a typical firm should
the industry become salient. This reduces incentives for firms within the industry to expend
effort hiding the visibility of their impacts, and increases the likelihood of industry salience
and therefore expected NGO funds—funds that it can direct both to forcing clean-up from
the industry itself and for other unrelated purposes (the backstop project).
The notion here is that an NGO benefits from having a (visible) enemy. By having a
visible enemy the NGO is able to rally funding both for its campaign and for other uses.17
17Researchers have long recognized that firms engage in strategic issue management (Ansoff, 1980). The
notion of NGO issue management of the sort formalized here has not been previously identified in the
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It is worth noting, however, that while the NGO chooses its mission to maximize expected
environmental benefit, because salience is endogenous it does not maximize environmental
impact given the probability that firms’ activities catch the public eye. Having to engage in
“issue management” means the NGO does not equate the marginal impact of campaigning
with the marginal impact of the backstop (i.e., γ∗ 6= γˆ), which means that the NGO picks
a mission with less emphasis on campaigning. We discuss the overall implications for the
NGO’s environmental impact in section 2.7 below.
As with firms, market structure is relevant for NGO choices.
Proposition 4. The NGO’s choice of mission, γ∗, may be increasing or decreasing in n,
the number of firms in the industry. Expected impact (i.e., EB(γ,m)) and expected funding
for the NGO are increasing in n.
2.6 Targeting salience: NGO preference for broad over narrow
campaigns
So far we have assumed that any campaign launched by the NGO targets the whole industry.
An alternative approach that the NGO might take in the event of industry salience would be
to target only that firm that caught the public eye and triggered salience (the NGO would
still wish to target the entire industry in the case when no firm is salient).18 In this case,
expected payoff for firm i is
Epi(hi) = r − p(hi, h−i)αγm−
(
1−
n∑
j=1
p(hj, h−j)
)
αγm
n
− hi.
It follows that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium h′,
−p1(h′, (n− 1)h′)αγm+ (n− 1)p2(h′, (n− 1)h′)αγm
n
= 1.
Lemma 1. Each firm exerts less cloaking effort if the NGO campaign targets all firms than
if it targets only the firm that caught the public eye and triggered industry salience.
The NGO can induce lower cloaking effort by adopting a strategy of broad campaigns,
exacerbating the free-riding problem of the industry and yielding less cloaking behavior.
scholarly literature, although it is suggested by the case study of Greenpeace and the Shell Brent Spar in
Baron (2012).
18Restricting the NGO to only being able to launch a campaign if a firm becomes salient does not change
the analysis of this section.
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Proposition 5 (NGO preference for broad campaigns). Expected impact is greater for the
NGO if it targets the whole industry (or randomizes over firms within the industry) rather
than targeting only the salient firm.
In colloquial terms the NGO will prefer to “tar all firms with the same brush.” By
softening the implications for any particular firm from being the one that brings attention
to the activities of the industry as a whole, the NGO increases the chance that this indeed
happens.
If firms were asymmetric and produced different levels of environmental damage, and
the benefits to reducing these damages ex post were non-linear, then the NGO would want
to adopt a more sophisticated targeting strategy to exploit the higher marginal impact of
inducing clean-up from a firm with greater damages. In designing its targeting strategy, the
NGO would then need to trade-off the benefit from exploiting a collective action problem
among firms with the added marginal benefits from systematically campaigning against
particularly damaging firms.
2.7 Welfare
There are two elements to thinking about welfare in the current model. First, does the NGO
make socially desirable choices given the need to account for salience considerations? In
other words, how does the mission γ∗ chosen by the NGO compare to that which the planner
would wish it to choose? Second, and perhaps more interestingly, how does the presence of
salience considerations—which we introduce into the literature on private politics in this
paper—exacerbate or mitigate any social inefficiency in NGO campaign decisions? We deal
with these in turn.
Expected social welfare is
EW (γ) = EB(γ,m) + nEpi(h∗(γ)).
At γ∗, the NGO’s chosen mission,
dEW (γ∗)
dγ
= −np(h∗, (n− 1)h∗)αme − αm < 0,
so the NGO does not maximize social welfare. In particular, given concavity of EW , γ∗ is
greater than the level that maximizes social welfare.
Lemma 2 (Socially excessive campaign orientation). The NGO devotes a greater fraction
of funds to campaigning against the industry than would a social planner that maximized
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overall welfare.
The NGO adopts a mission that allocates a greater share of funds to campaigning (smaller
share to backstop projects) than a social planner would prefer. The source of inefficiency
here is important to understand. In its calculations, the NGO does not weigh the impact
of its choices on expected producer surplus, whereas the social planner does. Thus, the
NGO over-weighs—from a welfare perspective—the (profit-reducing) campaign against the
industry.
Nevertheless, comparing this result with proposition 3, we see that the strategic ma-
nipulation of the mission in which the NGO engages in order to increase the likelihood of
salience (“issue management”) reduces its campaign orientation. As a result, the NGO’s
salience gaming produces a better welfare outcome than would arise had the NGO simply
equated expected marginal impact across campaign and backstop spending, which would
have produced an even more excessive campaign orientation. This is summarized in the
following:
Proposition 6 (Salience concerns imply NGO and social incentives more closely aligned).
The desire to influence salience induces the NGO to choose a more socially desirable mission
(i.e., EW (γ∗) > EW (γˆ)).
If strategic manipulation of salience were impossible the NGO would choose its mission to
equate expected marginal impact across issues. This would exacerbate its socially-excessive
emphasis on campaigning against the industry, as proposition 3 implies. The NGO’s strategic
manipulation of salience reduces its campaign orientation, moving it closer to the social
planner’s preferred outcome.
It is also interesting to examine the environmental impact per se of the NGO’s mission
in more detail. Proposition 3 shows that the NGO reduces its campaign orientation relative
to the case of exogenous salience, and this might worry donors or citizens whose primary
concern is environmental impact rather than overall welfare. However, a revealed preference
argument shows that this concern does not manifest itself in the NGO’s behavior. Recall
that γˆ, the NGO’s mission design with exogenous salience, is not a function of m, the level
of its resources. In the context of endogenous salience, the NGO could maintain the mission
design γˆ, and it would also enjoy additional resources me with probability np(h
∗, (n− 1)h∗).
These additional resources clearly allow the NGO to have a greater environmental impact
than it would otherwise. If the NGO then finds that an alternative mission design, γ∗, is
more desirable, then this must a fortiori provide even greater environmental impact. This
is summarized as follows:
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Proposition 7. The desire to influence salience enhances the NGO’s overall environmental
impact (i.e., EB(γ∗,m) > EB(γˆ,m)).
Thus, donors to the NGO need not worry that playing salience games will undermine
the NGO’s environmental impact. Instead, the NGO uses these games to increase overall
environmental impact.19 Nevertheless, combining the foregoing analysis with proposition
4, we see that the ambiguity in the relationship between the NGO’s optimal mission and
industry concentration also applies to the relationship between industry concentration and
the environmental benefit from either campaigning or the backstop. That is, when faced
with a less concentrated industry, the NGO may commit more (less) towards campaigning
and increase environmental impact by putting more resources towards its campaign (the
backstop).
3 Avoiding Salience by Behaving Well: Combining
Symbolism with Substance
So far we have assumed that the only way that a firm seeks to reduce the probability of
becoming the focus of public attention is spending on “cloaking.” Such cloaking is costly,
and hence a concern to the firm (and the social planner), but it is a cosmetic device and
delivers no direct social benefits.
This modeling approach has merit in its own right—there is substantial empirical and
case study evidence that firms in many settings engage in greenwash, public relations on
social impact, “uninspectability”, obfuscation, corporate opacity etc.—and has streamlined
the model significantly. However it should be clear that another important way in which a
firm might seek to stay out of the public eye is by taking substantive action to reduce its
environmental footprint ex ante (i.e., abatement), before salience outcomes are realized. In
this section we establish that the insights of the analysis are sustained if a representative firm
engages in both substantive and symbolic action to reduce risk of public scrutiny, justifying
our earlier approach on the grounds of simplification.20 We then go on to derive additional
19From (4) it can be shown that both the environmental benefit from the backstop and from clean-up by
firms increases when the NGO alters its mission to strategically exploit salience.
20More generally, there is a sizable literature in management on the strategic use of symbolic management,
as opposed to making substantive changes in corporate operations. For example, Delmas and Montes-
Sancho (2010) find that early participants in the U.S. Department of Energy’s Climate Challenge program
made substantive reductions to their greenhouse gas emissions, but late joiners were simply free-riders on
the program’s reputation, and made no substantive improvements. Similarly, Kim and Lyon (2011) find
that firms participating the Department of Energy’s Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry increased their
greenhouse gas emissions over time while reporting reductions, whereas non-participants actually reduced
their emissions over time. Though neither directly connects to our model, both studies demonstrate that
19
insights regarding the management of collective reputation by the industry.
In the extended model we will use a to refer to abatement and h to refer to hid-
ing, or cloaking effort; the function ν maps (a, h) into the probability space such that
p(ν(ai, hi), ν−i(a−i, h−i)) gives the probability that firm i catches the public eye—ν is the
“production function” that takes abatement and cloaking as inputs to reduce visibility.
Because abatement of environmental damage ex ante, a, is something to which the NGO
attaches value, but h is not, there is now an additional margin that the NGO will account
for. This will make the results of the model less precise. To ease the analysis and make the
main points clear we will let ν = a+h, so that abatement and hiding are perfect substitutes
in the reduction of visibility, and assume that abatement and cloaking effort each entail
unit marginal cost. This allows for firms to employ both substantive and symbolic action to
influence salience, but removes any scale effect.
A firm’s decision regarding how much to reduce its visibility is the same as in section
2.5.2, and the equilibrium ν∗ is identical to the equilibrium h∗ given by (2). The only
difference introduced by treating cloaking and abatement separately is the relative intensity
with which the firm combines them to reduce visibility.
Letting ω be the share of abatement, in a symmetric Nash equilibrium firms choose a∗
and h∗ such that a∗ = ων∗ and h∗ = (1 − ω)ν∗. Since ν embodies abatement and cloaking
as perfect substitutes, any ω is a possible solution. In order to conduct comparative statics
we will treat the share ω as exogenous and this can be interpreted as the degree to which a
firm can substitute substantive for symbolic action (or vice versa).
Defining B as before, if the industry is salient then the payoff to the NGO can now be
written B(γ,m) +βnEa∗(γ) and if the industry is not salient the NGO’s payoff is B(γ,m) +
βnEa∗(γ), where β captures the environmental benefit associated with abatement. (If the
NGO does not know ω it takes the expected value of abatement. As the results do not
depend on the distribution for ω, we leave it unspecified.) Although the analysis for stage 2
of the game remains the same, the first-order condition associated with the NGO’s choice of
mission now contains an extra term. In particular, the NGO’s first-order condition is now
∂EB(γ∗,m)
∂γ
= E
∂B(γ∗,m)
∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Literature
benchmark
+ S(γ∗,m,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Salience
effect
+ βnE(ω)
∂ν∗(γ∗)
∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Abatement
effect
= 0, (5)
where S(γ∗,m,m) is the salience effect exactly as in (3) (replacing h∗ with ν∗ of course). In
comparison to earlier, to the extent that the representative firm avoids catching the public
there can be a sharp disconnect between the symbolism and the substance of corporate actions.
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eye through abatement (the last term in equation (5)), this encourages the NGO to increase
its campaign orientation.21 Differentiating the last term in (5) with respect to ω and using
the same reasoning as in proposition 3 leads directly to the following.
Proposition 8 (Salience avoidance through abatement increases campaign orientation of
NGO). If firms reduce visibility partly by abatement, the NGO chooses a mission that directs
a greater share of funds to campaigning (lower share of funds to backstop project).
In fact, equation (5) shows that in addition to the benchmark effect there are now two ad-
ditional effects pulling in opposite directions, the salience effect (negative) and the abatement
effect (positive). Compared to the “literature” benchmark, which ignores salience consider-
ations altogether, the NGO may bias its mission either against the campaign or against the
backstop, depending on which effect dominates.
Since part of each firm’s effort to avoid scrutiny now takes the form of substantive,
socially-valued abatement, the following is immediate.
Proposition 9. Expected environmental damage is lower if firms use abatement in addition
to cloaking to avoid public attention.
While it might seem that welfare should increase as well, the reduction in environmental
damage must outweigh the increase in the cost firms must bear from the NGO’s now tougher
campaign for this to be the case. In general, the effect on welfare can be positive or negative,
depending on the extent to which the NGO shifts its missions towards campaigning and by
how much firms respond to avoid salient outcomes.
In looking at firms’ environmental impact, when firms abate emissions to avoid salience
there are two channels through which environmental damage is reduced. There is an immedi-
ate environmental improvement that comes from firms reducing their emissions ex ante, and
the NGO is also able to get firms to clean-up more of their emissions ex post by launching
a tougher campaign. By reducing their environmental footprint, firms induce the NGO to
launch a tougher campaign that in turn causes firms to further reduce their environmental
damage. However, the additional cleanup that results from a tougher campaign is costly for
firms, and hence they have incentives to avoid it. As a result, it is straightforward to show
the following.
Proposition 10. When firms act non-cooperatively, they choose to undertake no abatement,
i.e., ai = 0 for all i.
21If h is interpreted as greenwashing, then the model predicts a negative relationship between the strength
of an activist’s campaign (here γ) and greenwashing, as in Marquis et al. (2016). However, it is the NGO’s
anticipation of corporate greenwash that influences its campaign, not the influence of the campaign on the
subsequent decision to greenwash.
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The proposition shows that firms acting individually prefer to undertake cloaking efforts
rather than actual abatement, even when the two approaches are perfect substitutes and
have equal unit costs. This reflects the sort of free-riding behavior that has led to many
environmental problems in the past, such as the 1984 disaster in Bhopal, India, when Union
Carbide accidentally released a large amount of methyl isocyanate (Broughton, 2005), or the
massive 1986 fish kill in the Rhine caused by chemical releases from the Sandoz plant in
Basel, Switzerland (Schwaback, 1989). In both cases, the industry responded by adopting a
program of industry self-regulation designed to protect its reputation.
In light of the last proposition, one would expect that industry self-regulation efforts
would involve collectively pre-committing to reduce the salience of their environmental dam-
ages by cloaking alone before the NGO decides on its mission. In this way firms would
influence the NGO to select a mission with less focus on campaigning, thereby reducing
both the amount of abatement they must do and the amount of clean-up that the NGO will
demand. That is, in an alternative setting in which firms as a group are given the chance
credibly to pre-commit to a type of action—symbolic or substantive—before the NGO de-
cides on its mission, intuition suggests they would favor the former as this induces the NGO
to soften its campaign orientation. This reality, however, depends on market structure.
Applying corollary 1 leads to the following.
Proposition 11. If the number of firms in the industry is sufficiently small, then firms prefer
to commit to cloak emissions (i.e., ai = 0 for all i). If the number of firms is sufficiently
large, firms prefer to commit to abate emissions (i.e., hi = 0 for all i).
This is understood as follows: a larger (more fragmented) industry is characterized by
greater free-riding so that the industry becomes salient more often, leading to the expectation
of a costly campaign. Even though abatement leads to a tougher campaign and extra effort on
the part of firms to reduce visibility, a commitment to abatement can reduce the expected
funds to the NGO by enough to make such pre-commitment worthwhile when (and only
when) there is a large collective action problem for the NGO to exploit.22 The driving
mechanism here is the more pronounced collective action problem created by salience in a
competitive setting, and hence the greater value to its solution through pre-commitment.
22Returning to the greenwashing example, when industries face the threat of an NGO campaign, our
analysis shows that a more competitive industry is less likely to greenwash, consistent with the findings of
Ferna´ndez-Kranz and Santalo´ (2010).
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4 Conclusions
Many disciplines recognize the importance of salience (including psychology, neuroscience
and political science) as a phenomenon. But work in strategy and private politics has
either ignored it, or treated the salience or non-salience of particular issues as exogenous
phenomenon.
In this paper we develop the first model of private politics that incorporates the strategic
creation of salience. We consider an industry whose reputation can be sullied if any member’s
social impacts draw public attention, and allow individual firms to invest in “cloaking” effort
that reduces the risk that their behavior catches the public eye. The industry is paired with
an NGO. The NGO has higher income when the industry is salient, and it recognizes the
capacity of salience to act as a “cash cow” —part of the extra funds raised can be siphoned
off to finance non-salient but nonetheless socially valuable activities. In adopting a mission—
which commits it to how it will split income between anti-industry campaigning and other
conservation projects—the NGO faces a tension between wanting to force the sector to
clean-up its damages and wanting to ensure a vigorous stream of income.
The contributions of our approach are three-fold. First, we showed that an NGO involved
in private politics can optimally “design into itself” features that encourage free-riding be-
tween firms in the industry. The NGO strategically exploits this free-riding through the
design of its mission and its campaign targeting habits. An important implication of our
analysis is that the sort of NGO that will thrive in this environment is one that develops a
reputation for targeting whole sectors, rather than single firms which that happen to catch
the public eye. In this way, the NGO nourishes the reputational externalities between firms.
This in turn raises the probability of industry salience, which increases the NGO’s income
prospects. Another success factor for an NGO is to adopt a mission that commits it to
devoting a high fraction of incremental funds to projects outside the sector (such as WWFs
Coral Triangle reserve)—not hitting the salient sector too hard. This further softens the
penalty that all firms in the sector face in the case that any one of them ends up “on the
front page.” In an important sense, the NGO needs (visible) enemies in order to fund its
activities, and it chooses a mission that helps to keep its enemies in the public eye.
The observation that there is a symbiosis between polluters and NGOs in generating
funding for the latter is not new. In a related vein, particularly emotive or TV-worthy issues
can be “milked” by social activists to attract members and donations to cross-subsidize other
activities. In a dynamic setting this may provide an incentive for the NGO to wish to keep the
cash cow issue “ticking over.” For example, according to one observer, “Greenpeace claims
to be dedicated to saving the whales. They are happy to exploit the emotional impact of
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the slaughter of these noble creatures to raise funds and recruit members, but less interested
in acting to end the practice of whaling worldwide” (activistfacts.com/organizations/131-
greenpeace/). They do occasionally run earmarked campaigns, however the vast majority
of funds flowing into the big environmental NGOs goes to the general “pot” for allocation
according to the broader organisational mission.
Second, we characterized the welfare implications of taking salience seriously in a model of
private politics. Perhaps surprisingly, the impact need not be socially undesirable. Instead,
it may help to mitigate a misalignment between the objectives of the NGO and overall
social welfare. Because the NGO is not concerned about producer surplus, absent salience
considerations it tends to over -invest in profit-reducing, anti-corporate campaigns. Taking
account of salience pushes its incentives back in the other direction.
Thirdly, we provided new insights into when industries will take symbolic versus sub-
stantive actions in response to social movement pressures. We allowed firms to reduce the
risk of catching the public eye by reducing impact (abatement) rather than obfuscation. We
showed that the more firms rely on substantive actions to shield themselves from salience,
the harder the NGO campaigns. This occurs because abatement, unlike cloaking, delivers
environmental benefits and so contributes directly to NGO objectives. Not surprisingly, en-
vironmental impact is greater when firms take substantive action because it directly reduces
damages, although this must be weighed against tougher NGO campaigns when considering
welfare. We further showed that firms acting non-cooperatively strictly prefer symbolic to
substantive action, but that a large enough industry will prefer to commit to a policy of
self-regulation that involves a strictly positive amount of abatement.
Although our analysis has generated a set of new insights, there remain a number of
ways in which the model was, of course, stylized, and could usefully be extended. One
of the most important—in particular in linking theory to real markets and the growing
empirical literature on how firms respond to social pressure—is to relax the assumption
of symmetric firms. A second would be to flesh out the details of market structure and
competition, exploring differences between price and quantity competition, and incorporating
horizontal and vertical product differentiation. A third area with rich opportunities for
further research is more detailed modeling of symbolic and substantive action, which was
rather side-lined in our set-up and warrants closer attention in future work. A fourth area
for further research would be to allow for multiple NGOs, whose strategies might interact
in a variety of interesting ways. Finally, while we offer a theoretical framework grounded in
what we believe to have been plausible assumptions, this is an area of research that would
be enriched greatly by detailed empirical investigation.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 2. Totally differentiating (2) gives that ∂h∗(n)/∂n < 0. It then follows
that
∂p(h∗, (n− 1)h∗)/∂n = −n∂h∗(n)/∂n+ p2(h∗, (n− 1)h∗)h∗ > 0.
Proof of corollary 1. Using condition (2), ∂Epi(γ)/∂γ = (n−1)∂h∗(γ)/∂γ−αm/n−p(h∗, (n−
1)h∗)αme. If n is sufficiently close to 1 then ∂pi(γ)/∂γ < 0. Provided ∂h∗(γ)/∂γ is bounded
below by a strictly positive constant, for n sufficiently large ∂pi(γ)/∂γ > 0.
Proof of proposition 3. Let γˆ = b′−1(φ)/[b′−1(φ) + αb′−1(α)]. Then γˆ is the unique point
such that marginal impact is equated across issues (i.e., B1(γˆ,m) = 0). For any γ < γˆ,
E∂B(γ,m)/∂γ < 0 and for any γ > γˆ, E∂B(γ,m)/∂γ > 0. Therefore E∂B(γ,m)/∂γ > 0
implies that αb′(αγm) > φb′((1− γ)m) and αb′(αγm) > φb′((1− γ)m).
Proof of proposition 4. In the special case when p does not depend on h, the sign of dγ∗/dn
is the same as the sign of
p(h∗, (n− 1)h∗) (B1(γ∗,m)−B1(γ∗,m)) =
p(h∗, (n− 1)h∗)mb′(m) (αb′(α)b′(γ∗)− φb′(1− γ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1− λb′(λ)) ,
for some λ ∈ (0, 1). If b(λ) = θ log(λ), for example, then dγ∗/dn is positive if and only if
θ < 1, and therefore the sign of dγ∗/dn is generally ambiguous.
From the envelope theorem,
∂EB(n)/∂n = [p(h∗, (n− 1)h∗) + np2(h∗, (n− 1)h∗)h∗
+ n(p1(h
∗, (n− 1)h∗)− (n− 1)p2(h∗, (n− 1)h∗))∂h∗(n)/∂n]
[
B −B] > 0,
where B = B(γ∗,m) and B = B(γ∗,m).
Proof of lemma 1. Suppose this were not the case, so that h∗ ≥ h′. From the equilibrium
conditions defining h∗ and h′, it follows that
−p1(h′, (n− 1)h′)αγm+ (n− 1)p2(h′, (n− 1)h′)αγm
n
=
[−p1 (h∗, (n− 1)h∗)− (n− 1)p2 (h∗, (n− 1)h∗)] αγme
n
. (6)
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Since −p1 is strictly decreasing in h,
−p1(h′, (n− 1)h′)αγm > −p1 (h∗, (n− 1)h∗) αγme
n
and hence (6) is false; therefore h′ > h∗.
Proof of proposition 5. If the NGO only targets the salient firm, each firm picks a larger h∗
from lemma 1. Now
∂EB(γ,m)/∂h = n[p1(h, (n− 1)h) + (n− 1)p2(h, (n− 1)h)]
[
B −B] < 0.
For any γ, expected impact is greater if the NGO targets all firms; hence the NGO can
produce a strictly greater payoff by targeting all firms.
Proof of proposition 9. From the envelope theorem, ∂EB(γ∗,m)/∂ω = βnν∗ > 0.
Proof of proposition 10. If all firms play ω = 0 with probability 1 then E(w) = 0. Now if
any firm i deviates to some ω > 0 with positive probability, then it must be that E(ω) > 0,
in which case γ∗ increases. Since ν∗ remains that same, and hence the probability of salience
remains unchanged, a larger γ∗ translates into a reduction in expected profit for firm i.
References
Aldashev, G. and Verdier, T. (2010). Goodwill bazaar: NGO competition and giving to
development. Journal of Development Economics, 91(1):48–63.
Abito, J. M., Besanko, D. and Diermeier, D. (2016). Corporate reputational dynamics,
private regulation, and activist pressure. In John M. De Figueiredo, Michael Lenox, Felix
Oberholzer-Gee, Richard G. Vanden Bergh, editors, Strategy Beyond Markets, volume 34
of Advances in Strategic Management, pages 235–299. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Ansoff, H. I. (1980). Strategic Issue Management. Strategic Management Journal, 1(2):131–
148.
Baron, D. P. (2001). Private politics, corporate social responsibility, and integrated strategy.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 10(1):7–45.
Baron, D. P. (2009). A positive theory of moral management, social pressure, and corporate
social performance. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 18(1):7–43.
26
Baron, D. P. (2011). Credence attributes, voluntary organizations, and social pressure.
Journal of Public Economics, 95(11–12):1331–1338.
Baron, D. P. (2012). Business and its Environment. Prentice Hall, seventh edition.
Baron, D. P. (2016). Self-regulation and the market for activism. Journal of Economics &
Management Strategy, 25(3):584–607.
Baron, D. P. and Diermeier, D. (2007). Strategic activism and nonmarket strategy. Journal
of Economics & Management Strategy, 16(3):599–634.
Bordalo, P., Gennaioli, N. and Shleifer, A. (2013). Salience and consumer choice. Journal
of Political Economy, 121(5):803–843.
Bouckley, B. (March, 3, 2014). Angry TATA Global Beverages instructs lawyers over Tetley
tea slavery allegations. Beverage Daily.
Broughton, E. (2005). The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review. Environmental
Health, 4(1):1–6.
Chetty, R., Looney, A. and Kroft, K. (2009). Salience and taxation: Theory and evidence.
American Economic Review, 99(4):1145–1177.
Davenport, T. H. and Beck, J. C. (2001). The Attention Economy: Understanding the New
Currency of Business. Harvard Business School Press.
Delmas, M. A. and Montes-Sancho, M. J. (2010). Voluntary agreements to improve environ-
mental quality: Symbolic and substantive cooperation. Strategic Management Journal,
31(6):575–601.
Evangelidis, I. and van den Bergh, B. (2013). The number of fatalities drives disaster aid:
Increasing sensitivity to people in need. Psychological Science, 24(11):2226–2234.
Ferna´ndez-Kranz, D. and Santalo´, J. (2010). When necessity becomes a virtue: The effect
of product market competition on corporate social responsibility. Journal of Economics
& Management Strategy, 19(2): 453–487.
Friedman, M. (1999). Consumer Boycotts. Routledge.
Gabaix, X. and Laibson, D. (2006). Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information
suppression in competitive markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2):505–540.
27
Grossman, G. and Shaprio, C. (1984). Informative advertising with differentiated products.
Review of Economic Studies, 51(1):63–81.
Haan, M. A. and Moraga-Gonza´lez, J. L. (2011). Advertising for attention in a consumer
search model. Economic Journal, 121(552):552–579.
Heyes, A. (2000). Implementing environmental regulation: Enforcement and compliance.
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17(2):107–129.
Heyes, A. and Martin, S. (2015). NGO mission design. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 119:197–210.
Hilgartner, S. and Bosk, C. (1988). The rise and fall of social problems: A public arenas
model. American Journal of Sociology, 94(1):53–78.
Hoffman, A. (2001). From Heresy to Dogma: An Institutional History of Corporate Envi-
ronmentalism. Stanford University Press.
Hoffman, A. and Ocasio, W. (2001). Not all events are attended equally: Toward a middle-
range theory of industry attention to external events. Organization Science, 12(4):414–434.
Jenni, K. and Loewenstein, G. (1997). Explaining the identifiable victim effect. Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty, 14(3):235–257.
Kim, E. H. and Lyon, T. P. (2011). Strategic environmental disclosure: Evidence from
the DOE’s voluntary greenhouse gas registry. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 61(3):311–326.
Lyon, T. P., editor. (2010). Good Cop/Bad Cop: Environmental NGOs and their Strategies
towards Business. RFF Press.
Lyon, T. P. and Maxwell, J. W. (2008). Corporate social responsibility and the environment:
A theoretical perspective. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(2):240–260.
Lyon, T. P. and Maxwell, J. W. (2011). Greenwash: Corporate environmental disclosure
under threat of audit. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 20(1):3–41.
Lyon, T. P. and Montgomery, A. W. (2015). The means and end of greenwash. Organization
& Environment, 28(2):223–249.
Marquis, C., Toffel, M. W. and Zhou, Y. (2016). Scrutiny, norms, and selective disclosure:
A global study of greenwashing. Organization Science, 27(2):483–504.
28
Maxwell, J. W., Lyon, T. P., and Hackett, S. C. (2000). Self-regulation and social welfare:
The political economy of corporate environmentalism. The Journal of Law and Economics,
43(2):583–618.
Milgrom, P. (1981). Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications.
Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2):380–391.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management
Review, 16(1):145–179.
Schwaback, A. (1989). The Sandoz spill: The failure of international law to protect the
Rhine from pollution. Ecology Law Quarterly, 16:443–480.
Sequeira, J. (May 6, 2016). Chocolate company’s growth puts a spotlight on child labor in
West Africa. Law Street.
Sinclair-Desgagne´, B. and Gozlan, E. (2003). A theory of environmental risk disclosure.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 145(2):377–393.
Stroup, R. L. and Meiners, R. (2000). Cutting Green Tape: Toxic Pollutants, Environmental
Regulation and the Law. Transaction Publishers.
Thorngate, W., Liu, J. and Chowdhury, W. (2011). The competition for attention and the
evolution of science. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 14(4):17.
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1998). The symbolic management of stockholders: Cor-
porate governance reforms and shareholder reactions. Administrative Science Quarterly,
43(1):127–153.
Winn, M., MacDonald, P. and Zietsma, C. (2008). Managing industry reputation: The
dynamic tension between collective and competitive reputation management strategies.
Corporate Reputation Review, 11(1):35–55.
29
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The right-hand panel is a picture of part of the WWF-operated Coral Triangle Reserve in
South-East Asia.
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Figure 2: Structure of the game.
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